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ABSTRACT 
The techniques presented herein provide efficient, scalable, and comprehensive 
industrial asset inventory and vulnerability detection in operation technology (OT) 
networks.  The techniques achieve this by adaptively and dynamically chaining traffic-
monitoring methods through an OT network.  Additionally, the techniques automatically 
and efficiently deploy sensors in an OT network to support the traffic-monitoring chaining 
and efficiently utilize resources in the OT network.  These techniques may resolve 
vulnerability detection issues and inventory tracking and classification issues that are 
commonly encountered in OT networks, which that often utilize network elements without 
traffic sensing features. 
 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The trend of incorporating smart technology into traditional manufacturing and 
industrial platforms to is often referred to as the fourth industrial revolution (i.e., “Industry 
4.0”).  Industry 4.0 will, at least in theory, result in ubiquitous smart factories and a wide 
ranging industrial Internet of Things (IoT).  However, in operation technology (OT) 
networks, assets are rarely fully visible and properly classified/inventoried, which presents 
a challenge that must be overcome to fully realize Industry 4.0. 
In standard information technology (IT) networks, classification and vulnerability 
detection tasks may be relatively straightforward; however, the techniques used in IT 
networks are often not applicable to OT networks. The main reason for this is because IT 
networks typically have: (1) endpoints, such as computers, smartphones, printers, etc., that 
are connected to a switch that can host advanced feature-sets;  (2) traffic that mostly flows 
to or from resources/servers located in remote data centers, the Cloud, etc. (e.g., traffic 
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flowing “north-south”); and (3) continuous network monitoring deployed for various 
assurance purposes.  The general north-south nature of traffic (e.g., item (2)) allows traffic 
classification to be run at a distribution/core layer and, collectively, the three 
aforementioned features may make classification and vulnerability detection tasks 
relatively straightforward for an IT network. 
By comparison,  OT networks typically have: (1) endpoints, such as Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLCs), Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), Human Machine Interfaces 
(HMIs), etc., that are connected to low-end switches (including unmanaged devices); (2) 
traffic flowing between endpoint controllers (e.g., flowing “east-west”); and (3) too much 
traffic to allow for continuous copying of traffic between all endpoints.  These three 
characteristics may render classification and vulnerability detection tasks more difficult on 
OT networks than IT networks.  In particular, since the endpoints are typically connected 
to low-end switches, the switches are unlikely to provide features that allow for full 
endpoint sensing and traffic monitoring.  Moreover, the general east-west flow of traffic 
may prevent traffic classification from being run natively on a distribution/core layer (as 
traffic never gets there).  Finally, without continuously copying traffic, it may not be 
possible to continuously capture all of the traffic flowing between endpoints. 
In view of the foregoing, passive network traffic sensing features (e.g., SPAN 
and/or NetFlow features) are sometimes enabled on IoT endpoints (e.g., on PLCs, RTUs, 
HMIs, etc.) to try to classify OT network assets and/or to try to detect OT network 
vulnerabilities.  For example, this may be achieved with hardware sensors and/or  software 
sensors/apps deployed on endpoints.  However, each of these solutions has downsides.  For 
example, hardware sensors must be physically inserted into the network (usually as pass-
through devices or as a device towards redirected traffic), which is labor/cost intensive, 
especially for large OT networks.  Moreover, a large number of hardware sensors may be 
required to holistically cover an OT network and to capture all communication patterns.  
Meanwhile, software sensors require compute and storage components that may not be 
readily available on an existing OT network.  Additionally, many industrial switches do 
not allow software switches to leverage existing network infrastructure and some cannot 
support hardware or software sensors. For example, only some switches have traffic 
sensing features, such as  Encapsulated Remote SPAN (ERSPAN) and Flexible NetFlow.   
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In view of these issues, the techniques presented provide efficient industrial asset 
inventory and vulnerability detection in an OT network.  The techniques adaptively and 
dynamically chain traffic-monitoring features while automatically deploying sensors in 
strategic locations within the OT network.  More specifically, the proposed techniques 
chain various traffic monitoring techniques to eliminate hardware and software constraints 
in the network.  For example, the techniques may create one or more of the following 
chains: 
 RSPAN --> ERSPAN --> Sensor 
 RSPAN --> ERSPAN --> Flexible Netflow --> Sensor 
 ERSPAN --> SD-AVC --> Sensor 
 
This configuration could be deployed automatically by a network orchestrator. 
 The techniques are dynamic because they can take into account events occurring in 
the network (e.g. link up/down events where endpoints are connected to, results from a 
reasoner about the state of asset classification, etc.).  Observed events can be used to start 
and stop monitoring of a given traffic flow, thereby reducing an overall impact on the 
network (network traffic) and sensor utilization (compute, storage resources).  Meanwhile, 
the techniques are adaptive because the techniques may determine and deploy sensors in 
on selected network elements to optimize the OT network and minimize costs. 
 As a more specific example, at least a portion of the techniques are now described 
in connection with the relatively simple OT network illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1: Example Traffic flows in an OT network 
HMI 
HMI 
RTU 
4
Ka?mierski: INDUSTRIAL ASSET INVENTORY AND VULNERABILITY DETECTION IN OPERATI
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020
 4 5985 
In this OT network, there are a number of endpoints (e.g., PLCs, HMIs, and an RTU) 
connected to network elements (SW-1, SW-2, SW-3, SW-4, and SW-5).  SW-1 and SW-5 
(marked in green) are high-end switches and fully support sensor capabilities (e.g., 
switches with a software sensor). Meanwhile, SW-2 (red) is an unmanaged switch and SW-
3 and SW-4 (yellow) are low-end switches, and none of SW-2, SW-3, and SW-4 support 
sensor capabilities. 
In the Figure 1 OT network, the techniques presented herein can dynamically chain 
various traffic monitoring techniques as follows.  First, a network orchestrator can build a 
topology of the network and monitor link utilization on OT devices, as well as events 
coming on these devices (e.g., in any manner now known or developed hereafter).  Then, 
for each endpoint, the network orchestrator can:  
    I) calculate the closest sensor to the endpoint that can monitor the endpoint, 
insofar as “closest” may be determined based on a compound metric that may 
include sensor utilization, link utilization, path length to the sensor, etc.; 
    II) dynamically configure and deploy a chain of traffic monitoring features; and 
    III) monitor the state of the endpoint (e.g., based on replicated traffic or a 
captured traffic summary) for industrial asset inventory and vulnerability detection. 
As an example of a chain of traffic monitoring features, a network element to which the 
endpoint is connected may be configured to implement remote SPAN (RSPAN), a path 
towards the sensor may be configured to implement RSPAN on a virtual local area network 
(VLAN), and a network element hosting a sensor (e.g., software or hardware) can be 
configured to implement RSPAN, either alone or in combination with additional traffic 
sensing features (e.g., Flexible NetFlow).  As soon as a classification and/or detection 
process is completed, the network elements can be reconfigured to remove the added 
features (e.g., RSPAN) from the network and reduce overall resource consumption in the 
network and/or on the sensor. 
If, after an initial configuration of endpoints, a new endpoint joins the session, the 
network orchestrator can detect the endpoint (e.g. via Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) interface-up trap message or other known techniques) and iterate the 
techniques laid out above. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the OT network of Figure 1 with traffic sensing features (e.g., 
RSPAN sessions) deployed for industrial asset inventory and vulnerability detection.  As 
is shown, in this example, SW-3 enables traffic sensing features (e.g., RSPAN) for two 
endpoints and sends data through RSPAN VLAN100 to SW-1, which has software sensor 
capabilities.   
However, Figure 2 is just an example and, in other instances, the deployment of 
traffic sensing features could differ.  For example, if network elements are unmanaged 
and/or do not support traffic sensing features, monitoring can be enabled on the uplinks of 
unmanaged switches.  Figure 3 illustrates an example use-case where both uplinks of 
unmanaged SW-2 are monitored by remote sensors by mirroring traffic from unmanaged 
switch uplinks. 
 
Next, as mentioned above, the techniques presented herein can automatically 
deploy sensors on selected network elements.  Specifically, based on the OT network 
topology, a network orchestrator can dynamically scale-out/scale-in sensors to limit 
amount of traffic redirection from the endpoints in the OT network.  This automatic 
deployment will optimize the usage of compute, network, and/or storage resources in the 
OT network.  That is, automatic deployment of sensors can be achieved with an adaptive 
mechanism that can insert sensors on (or remove sensors from) network elements in an OT 
Figure 2: Sensor placement and traffic redirection 
sessions (use-case: low-end switches) 
Figure 3: Sensor placement and traffic redirection 
sessions (use-case: unmanaged switches) 
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network to provide industrial asset inventory and vulnerability detection while optimizing 
required resources needed for this task. 
According to one example, the mechanism may be achieved in accordance with an 
algorithm that, for a given graph network topology, determines a list of vertices in the graph 
for sensor deployment that will optimize resource functionality.  The determination is made  
based on knowledge of where sensors are positioned in the topology, knowledge of which 
network elements can support sensor functionality, and knowledge of which network 
elements in the topology need to be monitored.  
Put another way, a list of vertices in a graph T, represented as L'={l1', l2', ..., lj'}, 
can be calculated to optimize resource given function: f(T, L, L', S, M): L' = min f(T, L, L', 
S, M), where the aforementioned variables are: 
 T represents the network topology and may represented by T = (V, E), where V 
represents all vertices (e.g., network elements) in the network and E represents edges 
in the network (e.g., weighted links based on link bandwidth / averaged link utilization; 
 L represents a list of sensors in graph T which are working at given time and may 
be represented as L={l1, l2, ..., ln}, where l1,l2,...ln belong to vertices V in graph T; 
 S represents a list of network elements that are capable of sensor functionality and 
may be represented as S={(s1,c1),(s2, c2),..., (sm, cm)}, where s1,s2,...sm belong to 
vertices V in graph T and c1,c2,...,cm are network-element capabilities and/or 
constraints (e.g. memory/central processing unit/ storage / available licenses, etc.); and 
 M represents a list of network-elements that needs to be monitored is represented 
by M={(m1, c1'),(m2, c2'), ..., (mi, ci'))}, where m1,m2,..,mi belong to vertices V in 
graph T that needs to be monitored with  under constraints c1', c2',..., ci'.  
As an example, the algorithm could use shortest-path first, where overall distance 
between set M (network-elements that needs to be monitored) and set L' (network-elements 
where sensor can be deployed) is minimal.  As is shown in Figure 4, with such an algorithm, 
initially for: T={}, L={all network-elements marked in red, such as M1}, the optimization 
function will give as a result: L'={SW-4, SW-5, SW-6} that can be used by the network 
orchestrator to deploy sensors at network elements SW-4, SW-5, and SW-6. 
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Figure 4: OT network / Automatic sensor deployment on selected network elements 
 
Additionally or alternatively, the algorithm can could attempt minimize sensor 
deployment (i.e., instead of or in addition to determining a deployment based on shortest 
path-first).  In such a case, the final sensor placement could be:  L'={SW-1} or L'={SW-
5}, assuming equal cost link bandwidth.  
In sum, the techniques described herein provide efficient, scalable, and 
comprehensive industrial asset inventory and vulnerability detection in operation 
technology (OT) networks.  The techniques achieve this by adaptively and dynamically 
chaining traffic-monitoring methods through an OT network.  Additionally, the techniques 
automatically and efficiently deploy sensors in an OT network to support the traffic-
monitoring chaining and efficiently utilize resources in the OT network.  These techniques 
may resolve vulnerability detection issues and inventory tracking and classification issues 
that  are commonly encountered in OT networks, which that often utilize network elements 
without traffic sensing features. 
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